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Brexit: A positive case for immigration

Immigration is the hot-button issue in this referendum; Leave has increasingly focussed on the topic in recent weeks (largely because they haven’t been able to make arguments about sovereignty or the economy stick). Why?

It’s an emotive issue, one where it’s easy (and tempting) to substitute personal experience for wider fact, succumbing to confirmation bias and misrepresentative extrapolation of local patterns to global truths. Likewise, the issue of immigration is treated very differently depending on location and the local economic situation.

The arguments raised by Leave look a lot like those cited on the economy: raw numbers, devoid of context, are placed before us, hoping to overwhelm. Some examples:

  • 1.5 Million EU migrants moved to the UK between 2004 and 2010. Most of them were low-skilled. Low-skilled EU migrants can often deprive British citizens of jobs in the low-skilled end of the labour market.
  • Migration accounts for one third of the deficit in social housing and undoubtedly puts pressure on public services as a whole.
  • A quarter of a million EU migrants come here every year — a city the size of Newcastle

They hope to create a sense that these figures, when combined with isolated experiences that leave us with a bad opinion of immigrants, adds up to a full-blown crisis that is robbing Britain of its economic vitality and social cohesion. That’s simply not true.

Immigrants are employed in greater proportion than native Brits (even according to the Daily Mail), and contribute more in taxes than they take out in services. They integrate well into the local population, especially after a generation or two (“Britons loathe immigration in principle, but quite like immigrants in practice”). In Brexit-specific terms, issues attributed to migration would not be solved by leaving the EU.

At a basic level, the fact that areas with more immigrants are more accepting of them demonstrates that immigration is not a devastating wave, but rather an influx of fresh perspectives, talent and enthusiasm. Those opposed to immigration cannot rely on economic reality to justify their discontent; their opposition arises from an emotional distaste for the ‘other’ — xenophobia in its purest form.

Don’t let those feelings overwhelm you. Here are the facts.

Concern over immigration is not new, and yet the doomsday hasn’t materialised.

A quick-and-dirty method is to see what Google claims for interest in a search term over time. Interest in this topic has actually been pretty stable over time, suggesting that a ‘breaking point’ is not, in fact, nigh.

Indeed,

Anti-immigration sentiment has been widespread at least since the 1950s, when post-war immigration from former British colonies began changing the racial makeup of the country…they simply give people the sense that their island nation is becoming less “British.” Muslim extremism and refugees may have little to do with workers coming in from Poland, but the refugee crisis has caused them to bleed together in people’s minds. — Time Nor does public opinion on the issue track reality.

How, then, to explain Britons’ xenoscepticism?

For most of the past three decades the economy, unemployment or the health service has been a priority for the British; now such concerns have dropped away, leaving room for immigration to rise up the agenda [although there may be a natural tendency to partially blame immigrants for that small minority still to recover from the recession].

(all via The Economist)

Migrants are net contributors to British society.

Despite misrepresentative claims to the contrary, migrants (and free movement of labour) are good for the British economy.

There are good reasons to think that free movement is good for productivity, allowing firms to recruit widely for skills. It’s also good for public finances, bringing in young migrants keen to work whose contributions in taxes outweigh any costs imposed on the public exchequer. And it’s good for economic dynamism, allowing fresh ideas to spread and be adopted. — Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

EU nationals of working age are more likely to be in work than UK nationals and non-EU citizens. About 78% of working age EU citizens in the UK are in work, compared to around 74% of UK nationals and 62% of people from outside the EU. — Full Fact

Migrants from both within and outside the EU are less likely to claim benefits than UK nationals. DWP statistics show that as of February 2015, just over 5 million people were claiming welfare benefits; of those, about 370,000 (7.2 per cent) were non-UK nationals at the time that they registered for a National Insurance number; and of those, only 114,000 (2.2 percent of the total) were EU nationals. Since those born abroad make up 16 percent of the working age population, and those born in the EU make up about 6 percent, it can be seen that migrants of both types are considerably less likely to claim out-of-work benefits. — New Statesman

Yet the public is systematically misinformed when it comes to the motivations behind immigration. The vast majority of them are here to work hard, make a better life for themselves and their families, and contribute to the British economy and society.

Any failure in NHS/Housing policy is due to government underfunding, not immigration.

It’s true to say that immigrants use these services, but contrary to popular opinion, they place far less pressure on them than do Brits. They come to work, and skew younger and healthier than the general population. Our post on the economy clarifies that Brexit would not help the NHS by redirecting contribution funding; rather, it would hurt the service:

  1. Immigrants subsidise care for the older, sicker population, being both younger and healthier than the average Brit
  2. Brexit would threaten older Britons’ access to sunny Spain and its free healthcare, shifting the costs back onto the NHS
  3. An economic slowdown would further constrain funding

As this Guardian article explains, the NHS crisis has been in the news for years, and is due primarily to consistent underfunding – a political decision independent of the immigration situation.

On housing policy, the Migration Observatory demonstrates that immigrants are far more likely to rent on the private market, and don’t use social housing in greater proportion than do British citizens.

A common rebuttal to this data is the claim that although the overall proportion of immigrants using social housing may be in line with native Brits, they are often classified as higher priority, and therefore get preferential access. This claim was debunked by a LSE paper, which concludes by stating:

Although most immigrants are likely to be eligible to apply for social housing, there is no evidence (once demographic, regional and economic circumstances are controlled for) that they have preferential access to social housing – if anything the reverse seems to be the case.

Let’s put the numbers into perspective.

There’s also a sense among Leavers that immigrants are leading to unsustainable population growth. Britain’s population is growing at around .7% a year, ranking 155th in the world according to the UN. While higher than some other countries in Europe, it is not dramatically outside the norm, and can actually be seen as a good thing:

Britain’s growth spurt, which began at the end of the 1990s, is a sign of success…Some of our European neighbours struggling with declining populations, such as Germany, can only look on in envy. — BBC

The UK is a desirable destination for EU migrants because of its success; there are jobs to be found, the economy is doing well, and there is generally more tolerance for immigrants than other countries.

This is generally a self-regulating issue; witness the dramatic drop in migration to the US during the recession in 2009 since jobs weren’t available. The current government has revised access to out-of-work benefits for recent UK immigrants, meaning that individuals can’t simply show up in the UK without a job and leech off the state (‘benefits tourism’). If the UK runs out of ways to productively employ migrants (the illusion of ‘filling up’), then the numbers will drop.

The ‘British’ issue: concerns over identity don’t play out in practice.

Why is this so important? Surveys show that both cultural and economic issues drive opposition to immigration. From the authoritative British Social Attitudes survey:

Yet it turns out that once again, it’s the abstraction to general misrepresentative truths is what’s behind much of the opposition to immigration.

People actually tend to like the immigrants they know. More settled populations like the Poles are generally favourably viewed now, despite widespread concern back in the early 2000s:

But what, really, is the Polish situation? It is much more encouraging than politicians imply. Poles and migrants from other new EU member states have been readily absorbed into Britain’s labour market. They are tolerated, even welcomed, locally. The huge imbalance between local experience and national conviction has implications for next year’s migrants.

The proof is in the pudding:

The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey…reveals that proximity to immigrants breeds tolerance of them. Residents of multicultural London have the most liberal views. Conversely, some of the least diverse bits of Britain are the most sceptical about immigration. — The Economist

I compiled data into the interactive graph below, which demonstrates that smaller bubbles (cities with a smaller immigrant population) tend to be more eurosceptic. Those populations living in diverse areas demonstrate that concerns over a mass appropriation of ‘British’ identity are unfounded.


Last words

Keep these facts in mind as you head to the polls June 23rd. Immigration has always been a controversial topic, but the wider reality looks a lot different than any individual experience. Brexit would not solve any problems with the NHS or other social services, nor would Britain benefit from disavowing the free movement of labour.