Drones, development, and the drawdown: three keys to victory in Afghanistan

Introduction

As 2014 draws ever closer, and the US continues to consider its strategic position in Afghanistan and the best course to plot for future relations with the Karzai government and surrounding region, voice after voice has waded into the fray. Mine is one in a thousand, yet I hope to provide some clarity in amalgamating several disparate strategic interests into a cohesive plan for action. America is tired of war; while the duration of the conflict has led the day to day action to fade from the public eye long ago, the personal and economic cost continues to rise, marked only by ever-diminishing word counts in the depths of the nation’s newspapers. Since the 2001 invasion, this conflict has cost 1,800 American lives and $400 billion: heavy tolls, indeed, for a war that many still believe the US has not yet won.

While it is true that shifting focus to Iraq in the mid-2000s allowed for a resurgent Taliban to gain critical mass and a resilient foothold, America’s commanders appear to have learned their lesson. Using experience gained refining the COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy in Iraq, the coalition’s efforts in Afghanistan have been markedly improved in the latter part of the past decade. The largely kinetic action of conventional warfare has been tempered by an increased emphasis on both demonstrating to the local population that the US does in fact have their best interests at heart, and harnessing latent ill will towards the Taliban into proactive action by Afghans themselves to kick radical Islamists out of their communities. These efforts have, with time, reversed the grip of insurgent forces on the country. There are now as few as 75 al Qaeda fighters in all of Afghanistan, and as the Afghani National Army’s ranks continue to swell past 300,000 and the police beyond 150,000, the Taliban’s ability to hold territory has been reduced to the point where they now only hold a handful of the most rural districts. General Allen’s May report reveals that nearly 50% of violence in Afghanistan is now limited to just 17 of the country’s 397 districts. While Obama and other senior military officials continue to liaise with the Afghan government in order to determine the arc of US involvement post-2014, I see at least 3 key areas, both in Afghanistan and the surrounding region, that require close attention in order to maintain such positive momentum into the future.

The role of Pakistan

First is the role of Pakistan in any larger regional security strategy. On course to become the 4th most populous country in the world by 2050, and facing an increasing population of hardened radical Islamists, the US realises that any strategy to maintain stability in the broader region after the withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan must include the Pakistanis. The functional amnesty that senior Taliban leaders and other militant groups such as the Haqqani network currently enjoy in the tribal areas plays a major part in furthering instability across the border in Afghanistan. Senior leaders are free to train, plan, and raise funds away from the rule of law in places like Khyber, Peshawar, and Waziristan; heightened tensions between Pakistan and the US after a number of high profile incidents in the past few years (the Salala attack as well as the Osama bin Laden raid to name just two) have undermined cooperation between the two and foiled hopes of increasing joint counterterrorism efforts to capture or kill such leaders.  The result is that the US is aware of high value targets and their locations without trusting the Pakistani security apparatus to consistently take action against them. In turn, there has been a pivot towards the only reliable way that the US can currently reach such targets – drone strikes. The shadowy drone program has drawn overwhelming criticism in both the US and Pakistan, and domestic Pakistani politics is increasingly focused on ways to stop strikes (the PTI party ran exclusively on a platform of opposition to American-operated drones in both 2011 and 2012). While publicly condemning US actions in the past, however, there was an understanding in the international community that senior Pakistani officials, from Musharraf to Kayani, continued to green-light covert action in private meetings with Washington.

That tacit approval may be coming to an end, however; Pakistan’s current leader, Nawaz Sharif, appears to be the first to condemn the program both in public and behind closed doors. In response to this growing opposition John Kerry on July 31 reassured Pakistanis in an interview on national television that President Obama was committed to winding down the program, and urged greater cooperation between the two countries on traditional counterterrorism efforts. Whether the US is actually committed to ending all drone strikes remains to be seen. In the interim, however, it is clear that there is decreasing tolerance of the status quo. Sharif has already brought Pakistan’s case to the United Nations, and while the majority of Pakistanis in places like the Swat Valley reject radical Islam and militant presence, they are they are increasingly shifting towards such extreme movements as civilian casualties continue to mount as a result of botched strikes (figures vary, but almost all independent agencies conclude that there have been at least 300 civilian deaths since Obama took office). Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations sees several options that could be pursued in order to both satisfy Pakistan’s desire for greater control and oversight of the program while still maintaining what, tactically speaking, has been America’s most effective counterterrorism tool in the region. Such ideas include disarming drones and allowing Pakistani forces to move in when targets are identified, or creating a dual-attrisation requirement whereby Pakistani officials would have enough control over the drones themselves to prevent the launch of missiles if they did not approve of the target or location of attacks. Top American officials see neither of these options as acceptable, however, as they have grown increasingly concerned, especially since 2011, about the ISI’s ties with the Haqqani network (which itself is closely affiliated with the Taliban) and other jihadist groups. They are afraid that valuable targets would be tipped off or blatantly allowed to escape from under their very noses if Pakistani attrities had direct input on strikes.

What is seen as the most plausible solution instead is the establishment of a requirement for the US to receive “pre-attrisation” for strikes, seeking approval for attacks in a general region or against a list of individuals that could then be unilaterally acted upon when the opportunity presented itself. Such a commitment isn’t ideal for either party; the Pakistani government would have to finally come clean about approving of US drone strikes on their own territory, while Washington would still have reason to fret about the denial of permission to move on particular high value targets to whom the Pakistani government is perhaps closer than they should be. However, the alternative is far worse; Pakistan has a growing population increasingly intolerant of current US actions and a government with the keys to nuclear weapons. US interests in the region extend beyond the flow of Taliban into Afghanistan from the tribal areas; Washington must forge deals now that will help move Pakistan away from support of Islamist insurgents, rather than drive the country towards, creating a much, much larger problem in the future.

The role of China

The second topic to be addressed is that of China. The world has looked on as the Chinese government and companies alike have paid increasingly close attention to Afghanistan over the past year. China has never really taken a particular stance towards the war; it has stood on the sidelines, hoping that victory will elude the US, but also extremists alike. At least initially, China’s interests lay in preventing the establishment of permanent US bases in the area as well as ensuring that its Uighur separatists didn’t find safe haven in which to launch attacks on Muslim-dominated areas of China (mainly Xinjiang province). As such, they have had loose relations with the Karzai government for years, while never really giving up talking to senior Taliban leadership either. The Chinese government simply wanted to be in the position to defend their geopolitical interests no matter the war’s outcome. Over the past 12 months, however, China has taken a more active interest in Afghanistan as it currently stands, not just its potential future form. They realise that the country is in dire need of foreign investment to build infrastructure and monetise its oil and mineral deposits; long-term stability can only come about if Afghanistan’s natural resources are monetised.

The Afghan ministry of mining estimates that the country’s mineral reserves could be worth up to $3 trillion — major, major money for a country with a GDP of only $20 billion. China has been more than happy to let the rest of the international community do the heavy lifting to secure the country to the point where such investments can be made, and now that the stage is set it is moving ruthlessly to snap up all of the economic opportunities it can. Perhaps the most prominent example is its procurement of a contract to develop a massive copper mining operation at Aynak, just outside of Kabul. Facing competing bids from American, Canadian, and European companies, the Chinese firms MCC (Metallurgical Corporation of China) and JCCL (Jiangxi Copper Corporation) used significant financial backing from Beijing to their advantage in offering not only the best royalty percentage of any of the competing firms, but also by far the biggest infrastructure package. CNPC (the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation) has also secured the rights to three oil reserves in the Amu Darya Basin, and appear to be planning to sell the oil domestically. The overall picture being painted is one where the Chinese move into Afghanistan for the long haul. They recognise that it is an opportunity not only for immense profit, but also a chance to exert their influence on a developing government and to steer decisions in directions that benefit their own strategic interests. Despite economic competition, the US and China do share a common desire for regional stability; as the US draws down its troop levels China will be cautious of a power vacuum forming and leaving its newly developed economic assets vulnerable. This presents a valuable opportunity for America to cooperate with the Chinese in a bilateral security arrangement in Afghanistan.

The time has come to ask China to finally do some of the heavy lifting when it comes to providing physical security in the region. Chinese influence with the Pakistani government can prove valuable as Washington attempts to negotiate a harder stance towards policing the tribal areas, and China would surely benefit from the cooperation of the American military who currently find themselves as the de facto asset protection force for Chinese infrastructure development projects. It is an opportunity to be seized; while cooperation will not be easy for the two, they stand to benefit both in Afghanistan and in the broader context if they can learn to accept their differences and move forward based on common rather than competing interests.

ANSF

The final concern is the readiness of the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) to lead on issues of defence, both internal and external. This is perhaps the single metric that is most likely to determine Washington’s policy on troop levels in the immediate future. The administration, despite pressure from the American public and fellow politicians to draw down as quickly as possible, does not want to lose its hard-fought gains simply because it bowed too quickly to domestic will. While Obama is said to be seriously considering the so-called “zero option”, withdrawing all troops by the end of next year, he would be unwise to do so if the ANSF was not ready to pick up the slack. Fortunately, the signs are largely positive; Afghan troops are now exclusively responsible for providing security in 90% of the country, and are involved vast majority of engagements with hostile forces. The general population holds the army in high esteem (>80% favourability ratings), and the ethnic diversity present across all sectors of the security forces has helped to foster a sense of national rather than regional or ethnic pride. The Afghan army is finally reaching a point where it not only wants to fight for its country, but also is able to do so effectively.

That isn’t to say that the Afghan military is the finished product, though. Indeed, there is much that remains to be done in terms of developing logistical and support capability as well as a proficient air force. Currently when the ANSF encounter heavy resistance and need to call for close air support, such capability is provided exclusively by US forces, and the Afghans will be in no place to replicate those capabilities any time soon. Furthermore, the difficult task of developing and managing supply lines as well as running recruitment and organisational efforts lag far behind. For example, only a handful of units currently follow routine deployment schedules that allow soldiers time off to see their families; this has helped dramatically lessen the incredible attrition rate that is still seen in the rest of the Afghan military, which tops 20% per year. Afghan forces are still learning, and at the height of the summer fighting season their losses were far greater than ever experienced by the Americans, but they are not breaking. The ANSF have not lost a single base or district to the Taliban even after suffering heavy casualties, and their control will only strengthen as they gain experience and various support structures are built up around them. What the Afghans can do more effectively than the US ever could is gain support of the local population. The ANSF now has a 70% IED clearance rate thanks not to technology and training, but tips from the local population. They are also more effective at mobilising civilians for their own defence; between the formation of local militia groups and police and army forces they are able to not only take ground back from the Taliban, but to hold it.

As the insurgents continue to be squeezed, they have resorted to high profile attacks against Afghan targets in an attempt to retain some semblance of influence in key areas and on powerful individuals. While some have been successful from an operational perspective, strategically they have simply increased civilian opposition to their presence and actions, further solidifying the control of established government forces. Given these facts, the new Strategic Partnership Agreement currently being negotiated between Washington and Kabul should set out a general strategy for the removal of practically all combat troops while still maintaining a critical nucleus of special advisors and trainers to help the ANSF continue to develop in number and capability. While American commanders have been loath to suggest a certain number of troops they believe should remain after next year’s fighting season for fear of political ramifications, it is widely expected that the number will not exceed 9,000. Such a force need not be inadequate as long as they are given the correct mandate and sufficient attrity to carry it out to the best of their abilities. More important, however, is that Washington not turn its back on the country after the drawdown. There is need for continued aid, both developmental and military, as well as assistance in setting up effective institutions that can stand against insurgent forces long after the last US advisors have left. Pressure to slash foreign aid as a result of belt-tightening in Congress must be resisted at all costs; the last thing that the US wants to do right now is to be seen as abandoning Afghanistan while the country’s institutions are still in their infant stages.

Wrapping up

Shrewd policy decisions have helped the US bring the conflict in Afghanistan back from the brink since the mid-2000s, but President Obama should not take the encouraging signs as an indication that it is safe to take his foot off the gas. He must have the strategic perspective to see that promoting regional stability in the future involves not only providing the Afghans with the tools to effectively govern and defend their country against a variety of threats, but also balancing and tempering the actions of both China and Pakistan. Only through broad yet precise strategy can America count their efforts in Afghanistan a success; secure a mutually acceptable policy towards mitigating the Taliban’s safe haven in the Pakistani tribal regions, cooperate with China to provide security for foreign economic interests, and give the ANSF the support that they need, and President Obama can finally congratulate himself for a job well done and begin to plan for a future free of the longest war in American history.